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Abstract
This paper studies the changing characteristics of post-war international comovement under fixed
and flexible exchange regimes. I find that business cycle comovement among all the G7
economies was highest in the universally flexible exchange rate era following the collapse of
Bretton Woods (BW) and before the Basle-Nyborg agreement tightened the bands governing the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). With the exception of a few examples (Canada/US
and Germany/France) G7 business cycles were far less synchronized in the universally fixed
exchange rate BW era. More recently the ERM period in which continental Europe maintained
fixed exchange rates, is characterized by a high degree of comovement among continental Europe
and the English-speaking G7 countries, with little synchronization across these groups. I find that
these changing patterns of comovement were driven by changes in the propagation of shocks
rather changes in the relative volatility of shocks themselves across these time periods.
JEL Classification: E32, F41, F42, F47.
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1  Introduction
In 1999 Europe took the final step in the most ambitious monetary experiment of the postwar
era by establishing a common currency area (the European Monetary Union [EMU]), which is an
extreme form of fixed exchange rate regime where member countries use the same currency.
There is widespread belief, based largely on the Mundell-Flemming model, that countries tied to
a fixed exchange rate regime are more susceptible to foreign disturbances, particularly monetary
disturbances. In other words there is a belief that flexible exchange rates offer greater insulation
from foreign disturbances. A major concern surrounding EMU and fixed exchange rate regimes,
in general, is that business cycles of member countries may become more volatile under a
common currency or fixed exchange rate because they would be subject to not only domestic
shocks but also increased sensitivity to foreign disturbances.
This conventional view of fixed vs. flexible exchange rate regimes stems more from anecdotal
evidence than statistical evidence. Two recent events add to this body of evidence. First, is the
experience of the United Kingdom (UK) and its continental counterparts in the early 1990s.
Member countries of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), which stayed tied to the
German mark (DM) after German reunification, such as, France were forced to tighten monetary
policy and suffered a severe and persistent economic downturn. The UK chose to leave the ERM
in 1992 and devalue the pound against the DM rather than raise domestic interest rates to
maintain its currency peg with the DM. Unlike its continental counterparts, the UK experienced a
strong recovery (see Figure 1). Second, severe economic downturns in Mexico in 1994, and Asia
in 1997 came about because of massive capital outflows and banking collapses that flowed from a
currency crisis involving a U.S. dollar exchange rate peg that was inconsistent with the market's
desired level. Looking to the past, monetary historians, like Eichengreen (1992), frequently argue
that countries that abandoned the Gold Exchange Standard experienced an economic downturn2
that was far less severe than that of countries who stayed pegged to the United States' (U.S.)
during the depression of the 1930s.
One empirical observation that seems to be at odds with this view is the emergence of a
stronger international business cycle in the post-Bretton Woods (PBW), flexible exchange rate
period from 1971 to 1987 (see Table 1). The key stylized fact supporting this is the observed
correlations of industrial output fluctuations of the G7 countries in the PBW period which were
considerably higher than in the Bretton Woods (BW) fixed exchange rate period from 1947 to
1971 and the ERM period from 1987 to 1998.
1 This evidence works against the conventional
view of fixed vs. flexible regimes because cross-country correlations of output fluctuations rise if
the importance of foreign shocks rises. Moreover, it questions the insulation properties of flexible
exchange rates over fixed exchange rates. It also suggests that the behavior of international
business cycles maybe intimately related to the exchange rate regime.
This paper is an exploratory analysis of the link between exchange rate regimes and the
behavior of international business cycles. I estimate statistical models of G7 countries over the
three postwar periods: the BW universally fixed exchange rate period BW; the universally
flexible exchange rate period labeled PBW; and subsequent ERM period in which the EMU
countries adopted a fixed exchange rate, while the remaining G7 countries maintained flexible
exchange rates.
2 I use these empirical models to get a better sense of the factors underlying the
higher degree of business cycle comovement between G7 nations in the PBW period. There are
essentially two factors that lead to higher correlations of international output fluctuations. First,
was the change due to the nature of shocks affecting the G7 economies? In particular, did the
relative size of innovations affecting output change such that there is rise in the volatility of
                                                          
1 The Group of Seven (G7) countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and U.S.
2 The EMU countries are France, Germany and Italy.3
common and foreign disturbances affecting the G7 economies? Second, did the propagation of
these shocks change in a way to produce more similar cycles? More specifically, did the
responses to innovations change so that there was increased sensitivity to foreign disturbances
and/or a change in responses to all disturbances so that they become more alike? My empirical
results suggest that higher output comovement observed in the PBW era was due to fact that the
G7 economies had similar responses to shocks from all sources.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows Section 2 discusses the various exchange
rates regimes used by the G7 over the last century. Section 3 describes the changing character of
international business cycles over the periods governed by BW, PBW and the ERM. I review
other approaches to understanding international comovement in section 4. Section 5 describes in
detail this paper’s empirical strategy. The paper’s main findings (details of impulse response
functions, variance decompositions, relative size of structural disturbances across the three
exchange rate periods, and counterfactual simulations) are reported in section 6. Section 7
concludes by summarizing the paper’s main findings.
2  A review of G7 exchange rate regimes
In July 1944, representatives from 44 countries met in Bretton Wood, New Hampshire to draft
and sign the Papers of Agreement that established the International Monetary Fund.
3 The system
set up by the BW agreement called for fixed exchange rates against the U.S. dollar and an
unvarying dollar price of gold, of  $35 an ounce. Member countries held their official
international reserves in gold or dollar assets and had the right to sell dollars to the Federal
Reserve for gold at the official price. The system was thus a gold exchange standard, with the
dollar as its principal reserve currency.
                                                          
3 This section draws on material in Krugman and Obstfeld (1994), chapter 19.4
The earliest sign that BW was near collapse came in early 1968 when central bankers
announced the creation of a two-tier gold market, with one private tier and the other official.
Private traders freely traded on the London gold market and the gold price set there was allowed
to fluctuate. In contrast, central banks would continue to transact with another in the official tier
at the fixed price of $35 dollars an ounce. This came about because of speculation of a rise in the
official gold conversion rate following the devaluation of the British pound in November 1967. A
prime goal of the gold exchange standard was to prevent inflation by tying down gold's dollar
price. By severing the link between the supply of dollars and a fixed market price of gold central
bankers had removed the systems built-in safeguard against inflation.
The U.S. experienced a widening current account deficit in early 1971. This set off a massive
private purchase of the DM as most traders expected a revaluation of the DM against the dollar.
By August of 1971 the markets forced the U.S. to devalue the dollar and suspend gold
convertibility with other central banks. At the Smithsonian agreement in December 1971 the U.S.
dollar was devalued roughly 8 percent against all other currencies. An ever-widening U.S. current
account deficit led to further speculative attacks against the dollar in February of 1973. By March
of 1973 the U.S. dollar was floating against the currencies of Europe and Japan. This marked the
official end of the fixed exchange period for the U.S. Although one could argue that the U.S.
abandoned fixed exchange rates in August of 1971. In response to this my data analysis treats
August 1971 as the end of the BW universally fixed exchange rate period.
While the U.S., Canada and Japan have maintained flexible exchange rates regimes in the
PBW era, European G7 countries have dabbled with various fixed/managed exchange rate
regimes. The first of these regimes was the so-called European Snake in the Tunnel, implemented
in the Spring of 1972, which attempted to keep BW alive by allowing bilateral trading bands for5
European currencies of ± 1 percent and common trading band of ± 2.25 percent against the U.S.
dollar. This arrangement ended with BW in early 1973.
The second regime grew out of meeting between German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and
French President Valery Giscard d’ Estaing in 1978. The Exchange Rate Mechanism was created
in 1979 as part of the European Monetary System (EMS). The ERM included Germany, France
and Italy, while all European Community (EC) countries were part of the broader EMS. The UK
by virtue of its EC membership was a member of the EMS, but initially opted out of the ERM.
They joined the ERM arrangement briefly in the early 1990s. Monetary historians divide the
ERM into three periods. The first version ran from 1979 to 1987. All ERM currencies were fixed
to each other, with a band of fluctuations of ± 2.25 percent around bilateral parity (Italy was
allowed a margin of ± 6 percent, in recognition of its higher rate of inflation and political
difficulties). Although this was established as a fixed exchange rate regime, bilateral parities
could with the approval of the EMS be adjusted. Realignments were frequent, leading most
observers to view this as a period of flexible exchange rates. In light of this, I treat the period
following March 1973 to the end of 1986 as universally flexible exchange rate period, since all
industrial countries has moved to flexible exchange systems by this date. I label this era PBW.
The second version of ERM was the result of the Basle-Nyborg agreement and ran from
September 1987 to September 1992. During this period there were infrequent realignments. In
contrast to the earlier regime where member countries attempted to maintain stability with a
basket of EC currencies, under the second ERM regime the DM (the perennial low inflation
currency) became the anchor currency; just as the U.S. dollar had been under BW. In this setting
the Bundesbank was the only ERM member with the freedom to act on its own. The UK joined
the ERM in October 1990, but quickly abandoned it in September 1992 when they found that the
Bundesbank’s stance on monetary policy to be inconsistent with their own fundamentals,6
returning to a flexible exchange rate regime with the other G7 European countries, which they
still maintain. Italy also abandoned the ERM in September 1992, but returned in November 1996
as a condition of entry to the EMU to which it is a member.
The crisis of 1992 led to the final stanza of the ERM, which ran from 1993 to the introduction
of the EMU in 1999.  This was a continuation of the previous regime with wider bands over
which currencies could fluctuate against the DM. Bilateral parties could move by as much as
± 15 percent, suggesting this was little different from a floating exchange rate regime. Although
it is true that the French franc (FF) fluctuated slightly outside its earlier narrow ± 2.25 percent,
suggesting that the French monetary authorities were fully committed to maintaining a fixed
exchange rate with Germany during and after this turbulent period. In light of this, I consider the
period from 1987 to 1998 to be a fixed exchange rate era for the EMU G7 economies, which I
label ERM.
The ERM eventually gave way to the EMU in January 1999, with the introduction of a single
currency across 12 European countries. One of the preconditions to EMU entry was membership
in the ERM. The EMU does not afford Germany any special status as in the second and third eras
of the ERM.
3  International business cycles and exchange rate regimes
There is a wealth of empirical research documenting the changing properties of macroeconomic
time series of the G7 countries over the postwar era. A subset of this literature has focused on the
behavior of international business cycles over various global and regional exchange rate regimes.
The picture that emerges from that emerges from this research is that there has been little
tendency towards increasing international synchronization of cyclical fluctuations across G7
countries, with a marked decline the average coherence of international cyclical fluctuations
occurring over the second half of the 1980s through to the 1990s. The other image developing7
from this work is that there appears to have been a bifurcation in the mid-1980s. During this
period the English-speaking G7 economies (Canada, the UK and the U.S.) displayed similar
business cycles, while the EMU countries, along with Japan, displayed similar business cycles,
with little to no coherence across these groups over this period.
4
This large body of research has focused on gross domestic product (GDP), consumption and
investment data, which limits their analysis to quarterly and in many cases annual data. One of
the drawbacks of this approach is that there are often very few degrees of freedom in exchange
rate sub-periods, such as BW and ERM, which makes it difficult to obtain precise estimates and
make sharp statements about the changing nature of business cycles. I add to this literature by
studying the dynamics of industrial production, which is available on a monthly basis from the
International Monetary Funds, International Financial Statistics. While it is true that the
importance of the industrial sector of G7 economies has been declining over time--which possibly
makes that sector less important in terms of national business cycle dynamics--it should be noted
that the key characteristic of the national business cycles of G7 economies is that there is very
high comovement of all sectors of the economy, so industrial production typically displays the
same cyclical characteristics as GDP (see Christiano and ).
Tables 1 and 2 describe the cyclical behavior of industrial production over the BW, PBW and
ERM periods. Working down Table 1 I highlight the correlation of U.S., German and Japanese
cyclical fluctuations with the other G7 economies. Following the mainstream business cycle
literature I isolate the cyclical fluctuations of industrial production using a band-pass filter (BPF)
that captures frequencies of 18 months to 96 months. I do so using Baxter and King’s (1999)
approximate band-pass methodology, with a moving average of 36 months. In order to avoid
                                                          
4 See Stock and Watson (2003) for a survey of recent papers documenting international business cycles of
the postwar era.8
using data from a previous/future sub-period I ignore the first and last 3 years of filtered data for
each sub-period.
Three results emerge from Table 1. First, the PBW era displays a strong G7 business cycle in
which the fluctuations of all seven economies tended to be above or below trend at the same time.
Second, there is no apparent G7 business cycle in the BW era. The only apparent comovement
over this period occurs between the U.S. and Canada, and between Germany, France and the UK.
Finally, this paper adds to the finding that there was a bifurcation in the ERM period, which is
characterized by strong comovement among the English-speaking flexible exchange rate G7
countries (Canada, the UK and the U.S.) and strong comovement among the fixed exchange rate
EMU countries (France, Germany, and Italy) and flexible exchange rate Japan, with no apparent
relationship between these two groups. The point made by these correlation statistics is that there
is no consistent fact describing the behavior of international business cycles and exchange rate
regimes, since we observe strong comovement across pairs of countries under both fixed and
flexible exchange rate regimes. This statement is especially true for the U.S. and Canada, and
France and Germany.
Given the relatively small sample size of the industrial output data it may be the case that the
correlations in the PBW period are driven by one or two influential data points. I explore this
issue in Figures 1 and 2 by plotting the filtered G7 industrial production series over the fixed and
flexible regimes, using the U.S. and Germany, respectively, as the reference cycles. The low
coherence between the U.S. and other G7 economies (excluding Canada) is obvious in the BW
period, the period before the first solid vertical line. Similarly, for the U.S. and EMU countries in
the ERM period, the period after the second solid vertical line. The high correlation in the PBW
period appears to be linked to the 1973-75 period, which coincides with the first oil price shock,
and the 1979-83 period, which coincides with the second oil price shock and the period when the9
U.S. Federal Reserve experimented with direct targeting of monetary aggregates. While, the
separation in the ERM period, is clearly tied the U.S. slowdown in the early 1990s, which was
echoed by Canada and the UK, and the German post-reunification slowdown which occurred a
little later in the 1990s with obvious spillovers to France and Italy.
As has been noted by a host of researchers (see Stock and Watson (2003) for details) the
volatility of business cycles fell dramatically in the U.S. in the latter part of the 1980s through to
the 1990s. Table 2 reveals that this observation extends to the G7 BPF industrial production data,
with the ERM period percentage standard deviations being no higher than their PBW
counterparts. What is new is that that I find that that with the obvious exception of Germany the
BW period was also characterized by less volatile fluctuations than the PBW era.
4  Approaches to modeling business cycle comovement
One branch of the international finance literature has attempted to explain the international
business cycle through quantitative theoretical models of international trade. So far these models
are real in the sense that there is no role for monetary disturbances. They completely ignore
monetary aspects of the international business cycle by relying wholly on international business
cycle transmission through real routes such as goods and asset trade. In there extensive surveys,
Baxter (1995) and Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995) report that models which allow for
realistic trade in capital are unable to generate international comovement. In contrast, less
realistic models that ignore trade in capital goods, such as Stockman and Tesar (1995), have been
shown to generate international comovement. This analysis suggests that monetary or nominal
factors maybe an important component in explaining international business cycles of industrial
countries.
Others have approached the issue by studying international business cycles within the context
of a structural econometric models. Other empirical attempts have relied on cross sectional10
econometric methods. For example, Canova and Dellas (1993) study the relationship between
trade interdependence and business cycle comovement. They argue that comovement in the PBW
period seems to be due to common shocks rather than changes in the international transmission of
business cycles. There are a range of individual country analyses such as Hutchinson and Walsh
(1992) which studies the U.S.--Japanese business cycles over the fixed and flexible regimes. In
addition to multicountry analysis such as Ahmed et al. (1993) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1994) who study U.S.-aggregate G7 business cycles. A common finding among these studies is
that the nature of underlying disturbances changed over the fixed and flexible period. In
particular, global shocks became more volatile relative to national shocks. There is some
disagreement over whether there was any change in the way the U.S. and G7 responded to these
underlying disturbances when they shifted from fixed to floating rates. Ahmed et al. (1992) argue
that there was no change in the response to shocks under the flexible regime. Hutchinson and
Walsh (1992) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) argue that there were changes in the
response to shocks in the flexible period. Hutchinson and Walsh find that flexible exchange rates
afforded Japan some additional insulation from foreign disturbances, while Bayoumi and
Eichengreen argue that the shift to flexible exchange rates steepened the aggregate demand curve
of the G7, which tended to make prices (output) more (less) sensitive to supply shocks.
5  Empirical strategy
One way of summarizing interactions among a set of variables is through a structural vector
autoregression (SVAR). There is a wide range of variables one can use in analyzing G7 business
cycles. I extend the analysis of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) by estimating a series of bilateral
SVARs for the G7.  I limit the bilateral pairs to one anchor country (U.S., Germany or Japan) and
one of the remaining six G7 countries. In each case the SVAR includes six endogenous variables:11
log levels of the anchor country’s ( t y ) and G7 partners industrial production (
*
t y ); anchor
country’s CPI inflation level ( t π ); the inflation differential between the G7 partner and anchor
country (
*
t t ππ − ); anchor country nominal short-term interest rate ( t r ); and nominal short term
interest differential between the anchor country and G7 partner (
*
t t r r − ). This variable list
extends Eichenbaum and Evans’ analysis by adding a variable for the G7 partners’ industrial
production and by studying more than U.S.-G7 country pairs.
One of the challenges facing researchers is the limited degrees of freedom over the BW and
ERM periods, since these periods are restricted to samples of 12 or less years. Following
Eichenbaum and Evans, I overcome the data limitation by using monthly data, and limiting the
lag length of the estimates vector auto regressions (VAR) to six months.
5 This yields the
following model focusing on the dynamic behavior of a 6 1 ×  vector,
** * [ ,,, , , ] ' t tt tt t t t t Z yy r r r ππ π =− −
where the dynamics of  t Z are represented by a VAR,
1 () t itt ZL Z ε − =Φ + (1)
where ( ) i L Φ is a 6 6 × matrix of polynomials in the lag operator L ; and
** * [ ,,, , , ] ty t t r t yt t r r t π ππ εε ε ε ε ε ε
−− =  is a 6 1 ×  vector of disturbances assumed to be serially
uncorrelated, with covariance matrix  i Σ . I estimate this model over three independent time
periods, Bretton Woods{ ,} BW BW ΦΣ  are estimated using data from  [1958 1,1971 6] t MM ∈ ,
post-Bretton Woods{ ,} PBW PBW ΦΣ  are estimated using data from  [1973 1,1985 12] tM M ∈ and
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Exchange Rate Mechanism{ ,} ERM ERM ΦΣ  are estimated using data from
[1987 6,1998 12] tM M ∈ .
6
Before I can shed light on the issue of whether increased comovement in national output
occurred because of changes in the relative volatility of international versus national disturbances
and/or changes in the response to international and national disturbances I need to impose some
structure on the system of equations described by (1). There are numerous forms of indentifying
restrictions in the literature. In their work on Japan, Hutchinson and Walsh (1992) impose long-
run restrictions on the data. Identification in Ahmed et al. (1993) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1994) comes from different theoretical models. I use a recursive structure popularized by Sims
(1972). This approach imposes restrictions on the covariance matrix of the disturbances of the
model. In particular, structural disturbances are identified by imposing a recursive information
ordering. Throughout the analysis I impose the following information ordering: anchor industrial
production; G7 partner industrial production; anchor inflation, G7-anchor inflation differential,
anchor nominal interest rate, G7-anchor interest differential. One interpretation of this approach is
that the anchor country’s monetary authority first chooses the value of the monetary instrument
(in this case the anchor country’s short-term interest rate) after observing contemporaneous
movements in anchor country output, G7 partner output, anchor country inflation and the
inflation differential between the anchor and G7 partner. The G7 partner then reacts to the anchor
country’s monetary policy with a lag of one period by choosing the value of its monetary
                                                          
6 The U.S., Canadian and Japanese models are estimated over 1958M1 to 1998M12, the German, French,
and Italian models are estimated over 1960M1 to 1998M12, and the UK models are estimated over
1964M1 to 1998M12. The limiting factor in these datasets is the availability of consistent short-term
interest rate data. See appendix A for details.13
instrument (in his case its short term interest rate) after observing the anchor country’s reaction to
all other variables in the international economy.
7
I implement this approach by assuming that the fundamental exogenous process that drives the
economy is a 6 1 × vector process  t u of orthogonal serially-uncorrelated shocks, with a diagonal
covariance matrix  i D . The VAR disturbance vector  t ε is assumed to be a linear function of a
vector  t u of underlying economic shocks, as follows,
t it Au ε = , for  { ,,} i BW PBW ERM = .
The recursive information structure implies that  i A  is the unique lower-triangular matrix with
ones along the diagonal, which is recovered from the covariance matrix  i Σ ,
' i iii ADA Σ= , for  { ,,} i BW PBW ERM = .
With these models in hand I can isolate can explore whether higher degree of business
comovement between the G7 nations in the PBW period is due to a change in the relative
volatility of fundamental disturbances or a change in the propagation of these disturbances.
Assessing changes in volatility of structural disturbances across the three periods is simply a
matter of comparing estimates of the diagonal elements of  BW D ,  PBW D , and  ERM D . While
isolating changes in the propagation of fundamental shocks is done by comparing the shapes of
the model’s impulse response functions across the BW, PBW, and ERM time periods. I also
highlight the degree of similarity of these propagation mechanisms by comparing the shape of the
anchor and G7 partner country’s industrial production responses to a given fundamental shock.
Finally, I isolate the importance changes in the relative volatility of shocks and propagation
process in explaining changes in G7 output comovement through a series of counterfactual
                                                          
7 It is important to note that the results reported in this paper are robust to different recursive orderings. In
particular, ordering the G7-partner ahead of the anchor country yields identical results.14
experiments. First, to assess the whether changes in the relative volatility of shocks are important
I simulate the models estimated in the BW and ERM periods under the assumption that the
volatility of shocks was the same as in the PBW era, and then compare the implied business cycle
correlations of industrial output with the actual estimates for the BW and ERM periods.
8 If the
counterfactual correlation coefficients are larger than the actual BW or ERM correlations I take
this is as evidence in favor of the hypothesis that changes in the volatility of disturbances
underlies the higher G7 correlations in the PBW era. Second, I conduct the reverse experiment by
simulating the PBW model under the assumption that the volatility of the fundamental
disturbances is the same as the BW and ERM periods and compare the simulated business cycle
correlation coefficients of industrial output with the actual correlations from the PBW era to see if
there is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that changes in the volatility of disturbances underlies
the higher G7 correlations in the PBW era. Lastly, I also compare this second set counterfactual
business cycle correlations with actual business cycle correlations of industrial production from
the BW and ERM periods to see if there is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that changes in the
propagation of shocks underlie the higher G7 correlations in the PBW era, since higher
counterfactual correlations would imply that changes in the propagation of shocks are the source
of the higher PBW correlation coefficients.
6  Results
This section reports on various characteristics of the estimated bilateral VARs. I begin by
providing a structural interpretation of the identified fundamental shocks. Then move on to a
discussion of the relative importance of international and national shocks affecting the G7
economies across the three exchange rate eras. This leads me to analysis of the changing relative
                                                          
8 I generate business cycle statistics for the simulated VARs data that is comparable with the band-pass
filtered data reported in Tables 1 and 2 by applying standard spectral techniques to the estimated time series15
volatility of international and national shocks. I change gears by examining the similarity of
responses to shocks and finish up the section with the series of counterfactual experiments
described in the previous section.
6.1  A structural interpretation of a typical bilateral VAR
I begin my discussion of the estimated models by tracing through the impulse responses of the
U.S.-German model estimated over the PBW era, with a view to ascribing a structural
interpretation to the identified fundamental shocks. Figure 3 traces out the U.S. and German
responses to a shock to U.S. industrial production. This shock has a temporary positive effect on
U.S. and German output, U.S. inflation, the U.S. interest rate and a negative effect on the inflation
and interest differential of the Germany and the U.S. I interpret this to be a U.S. demand shock.
Turning to Figure 4, we see that the shock to German industrial production has a similar effect on
the remaining variables of the system as did the U.S. demand shock, which leads me to interpret
this as a German demand shock. Figure 5 traces out the responses to a positive U.S. inflation
shock. The only significant response to this shock appear to be a negative output response in the
U.S. and Germany, which suggest that this is a U.S. supply shock. Responses following a shock
to the German-U.S. inflation differential also have a negative effect on U.S. and German
industrial production albeit much weaker then the U.S. inflation, which suggests that this could be
interpreted as a German supply shock. Figure 7 reveals the responses to a U.S. interest rate shock.
Higher U.S. interest rates lead to a temporary fall in U.S. and German output with a lag of about
one to two years. This shock also has a negative effect on the German-U.S. inflation differential,
but it is far less persistent than the shock to U.S. interest rates which suggests that the German
interest rate responds with a lag of about three months to a U.S. interest rate shock. The most
obvious structural interpretation of this innovation is that it is a U.S. monetary policy shock.
                                                                                                                                                                            
models to get a covariance matrix for industrial output at business cycle frequencies.16
Shocks to the German-U.S. interest differential yield similar output responses to the U.S. interest
rate shock. U.S. interest rates are estimated to respond with a similar lag as German rates to U.S.
interest rate shocks of about three months. I interpret these innovations as being German
monetary policy shocks.
6.2  Did the relative importance of international and national disturbances change?
Tables 3 to 5 report the relative importance of these six sources of disturbance across the three
exchange rate periods for 14 bilateral pairs. Each panel describes the percentage share of the n-
step ahead variation in anchor and G7 partner country industrial production attributable to the six
structural disturbances (for n=3, 6, 12, 24, 36, and 60 months). I also report the share of the
variance of industrial output at business cycle frequencies that is explained by the six
fundamental innovations in the row labeled BCF.
These tables reveal that relative importance of the six disturbances to the G7 economies
changed over the three exchange rate regimes, but not in a homogenous way. The most notable
common change was the rise in the relative importance of own output shocks for the EMU
countries and Japan in the ERM period. For example, the bottom panel of Table 3 shows that in
the U.S.-German model, the German industrial production shock accounted for 88 percent of the
variation in German industrial production at business cycle frequencies during the ERM period
and less than 50 percent in the BW and PBW eras. This suggests that these countries were subject
to shocks that were more idiosyncratic than in the past.
Before leaving these tables I make a final note in comparing the six bilateral models involving
the U.S., Germany and Japan. These panels reveal that the variance decompositions at business
cycle frequencies are invariant to the ordering of the anchor and G7 country.17
6.3  Did the relative volatility of international and national shocks change?
Tables 6 to 8 report on the changing character of structural disturbances over the various
exchange rate periods for 14 bilateral country models. Each row of a panel reports the percentage
standard deviation of the six structural disturbances for a given exchange rate era. The bot two
rows of the panel report the ratio of these standard deviations, with the PBW statistic in the
denominator.
As has been noted by Stock and Watson (2003) and a host of other papers using different
identification strategies, the volatility of shocks to G7 economies declined significantly from the
PBW to the ERM period. My estimates add to this finding. Tables 6 to 8 reveal that with a few
exceptions the percentage standard deviations of all structural disturbances from the 14 bilateral
G7 models in the ERM period were significantly smaller than their counterparts in the PBW era.
The exceptions are Japanese industrial production shocks, German inflation shocks, and Italian
interest differentials. Although higher than their ERM analogs, structural disturbances in the BW
era also appear to be less volatile than counterparts in the PBW period.
One possible explanation for the higher business cycle comovement in the PBW era was that
the volatility of international shocks rose relative to national shocks. In most cases the decline in
the volatility of structural shocks attributable to the anchor country and the G7 partner were fairly
uniform, which suggests that the changing character of business cycle comovement cannot be
explained by a shift in the relative volatility of disturbances affecting the G7 economies.
6.4  Were responses to national and international shocks more alike in PBW?
Figures 9 to 21 consider another avenue of change in the G7 economies. They reveal the
similarity of the anchor and G7 country’s industrial production responses to structural innovations
across the three different exchange rate eras.18
Figure 9 is a useful starting place since it shows that the responses of the U.S. and Canadian
industrial production to all six structural disturbances were similar during all three periods. This
was expected given the high level of comovement between U.S. and Canadian industrial
production over the entire sample. Jumping to Figure 11 we see a contrasting view in which the
U.S. and German responses are quite similar in the PBW era, but somewhat different in the BW
and ERM eras. It is pretty much the case that all U.S. and German responses differed in the BW
era. The differences are subtle in the ERM period, with significant differences appearing in the
responses to German industrial production shocks and U.S. interest rate shocks. Figures 10, 12
and 13 reveal a similar picture for the bilateral models of the U.S., France, Italy and Japan. Figure
14 in contrast, highlights different U.S. and UK responses in the BW period and quite similar
responses in the PBW and ERM periods, which mirrors the comovement pattern between these
countries: low on the BW era and high in the PBW and ERM periods.
Just as in the case of the U.S.-Canada model, the Germany-France model reveals that the
similarity of responses for German and French industrial production are invariant to exchange
rate period (see Figure 15). The similarity of German, Italian and Japanese responses over the
PBW and ERM eras are also evident in Figures 16 and 17. These figures also highlight the
dissimilarity of their responses during the BW period. Differences in the German-UK responses
are harder to discern from Figure 18. The most noticeable difference in the ERM period is in the
German and UK response to shock to German industrial production, which matches the German-
U.S. case. I find that the results are robust to the change of ordering of anchor countries (see
Figures 19 to 21).
6.5  Counterfactual experiments: Shocks vs. Propagation
Table 9 quantifies these observations of the last three subsections through a series of
counterfactual simulation experiments. The first column of Table 9 reports the simulated business19
comovement of G7 industrial production using the PBW propagation mechanism
{ ,} PBW PBW A Φ and the PBW structural disturbance covariance matrix  PBW D . These simulated
correlations mirror the actual correlations reported in Table 1. Columns 2 and 5 report similar
simulated statistics for the BW and ERM models. The simulated ERM correlations are extremely
close to their actual couterparts in Table1. The simulated BW correlations are somewhat higher
than their analogs in Table 1, but they preserve pattern of G7 correlations observed in the BW
era, such as the U.S. displaying significantly higher comovement with Canada.
Column 3 considers the role played by changes in the volatility of shocks in explaining the
increase in PBW correlations by simulating the BW model under the assumption that the
fundamental shocks to the BW economies were the same as the PBW economies. In other words,
I simulate business comovement of G7 industrial production using the BW propagation
mechanism { ,} BW BW A Φ and the PBW structural disturbance covariance matrix  PBW D .
Comparing columns 2 and 3 we see that simulating the BW model using the more volatile PBW
disturbances generates business comovement that has the same pattern as that observed using the
BW disturbances. I repeat this exercise for the ERM period, by simulating the ERM model under
the assumption that the fundamental shocks to the ERM economies were the same as the PBW
economies. The results are reported in column 6. Just as in the BW case, the pattern of
comovement is the same as that observed using the ERM disturbances. Columns 4 and 7 report
the findings of complimentary experiments in which the PBW model is simulated under the
assumption that the shocks facing the G7 economies were the same as those in the BW and PBW
eras, respectively. In both cases the pattern of comovement is the same as that observed in the
PBW era. This says that the pattern of comovement is invariant to the changes in the relative
volatility of structural disturbances over the three exchange rate periods. It also implies that that
the changing pattern of comovement is tied to changes in the propagation of shocks. In the case of20
the PBW era vs. other exchange rate periods, Figures 9 to 21, the most obvious change to the
propagation mechanism was that the G7 economies responded to international and national
shocks in a similar. My ongoing research is exploring whether this reflects fundamental changes
in the policy reaction functions of the G7 economies.
7  Conclusion
The pattern of international comovement among the largest industrial nations changed
significantly over the BW, PBW and ERM exchange rate eras. One of the key lessons learned
from these statistics is that there is no consistent pattern regarding international comovement and
the exchange rate regime, since there are many examples of high and low international
comovement under both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes.
These statistics also provide a fertile ground in which to examine the factors that underlie the
changing characteristics of international business cycle comovement. I exploit these data in this
paper for that purpose. Using a series of bilateral SVARs for various G7 pairs estimated over the
three exchange rate eras, I show that the changing patterns of international comovement observed
in three postwar exchange rate eras was due to changes in the propagation of shocks, rather
changes in the relative volatility of shocks themselves, across these time periods. The key result
underlying this finding is that, in contrast to the BW and ERM periods, all G7 economies
responded to international and national shocks in a similar way during the PBW era. One possible
interpretation of this discovery is that the policy reaction functions of the G7 economies were
more alike over this period. A test of that hypothesis is left to future research.21
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Appendix A: Data sources and definitions
Industrial production
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
Anchor inflation
Log first difference of consumer price index (CPI), annualized by multiplying by 12.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics
G7-anchor Inflation differential
Log first difference of real exchange rate, annualized by multiplying by 12.
Real exchange rate = G7 partner CPI/(anchor CPI * nominal G7 partner/anchor exchange rate)
Source: Author’s calculations using exchange rate and CPI data from International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics
Interest rates
U.S.: Federal funds rate
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Germany, France, Japan: Call money rate
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
Canada, Italy, UK: 3 month Treasury bill rate
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
G7-anchor interest differential
G7-partner interest rate - anchor interest rate
Source: Author’s calculations using interest rate data from International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics.Correlation of Industrial Production with US
BW PBW ERM
Canada 0.75 0.73 0.84
France -0.23 0.83 0.24
Germany -0.16 0.78 -0.01
Italy -0.10 0.50 0.32
Japan -0.68 0.83 -0.19
UK -0.01 0.71 0.89
US 1.00 1.00 1.00
Correlation of Industrial Production with Germany
BW PBW ERM
Canada 0.35 0.77 -0.25
France 0.48 0.92 0.95
Germany 1.00 1.00 1.00
Italy -0.55 0.84 0.68
Japan 0.03 0.97 0.85
UK 0.72 0.59 0.02
US -0.16 0.78 -0.01
Correlation of Industrial Production with Japan
BW PBW ERM
Canada -0.53 0.77 -0.33
France 0.22 0.91 0.81
Germany 0.03 0.97 0.85
Italy 0.25 0.85 0.58
Japan 1.00 1.00 1.00
UK 0.23 0.55 -0.09
US -0.68 0.83 -0.19
Notes: All reported data are filtered using Baxter/King band pass filter using a moving 
average of 36 months, designed to capture frequencies of 18 months to 96 months (8 
years). Correlation coefficients are calculated using data from the specified exchange rate 
period. For example, correlation coefficients in the BW column are calculated from data 
covering the years from the beginning of the sample 1958M1 to 1971M6
Source: Author's calculations using International Monetary Fund monthly industrial 
production data from International Financial Statistics on CD-ROM.
International Business Cycle Comovement Under Fixed and 
Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes
Table 1Standard Deviation of Industrial Production 
BW PBW ERM
Canada 1.61 2.80 2.41
France 2.18 3.03 2.20
Germany 3.56 2.92 3.07
Italy 2.89 4.19 2.30
Japan 4.06 3.95 3.46
UK 2.17 3.77 1.78
US 2.03 3.70 0.95
Relative Standard Deviation (PBW) of Industrial Production 
BW PBW ERM
Canada 0.58 1.00 0.86
France 0.72 1.00 0.73
Germany 1.22 1.00 1.05
Italy 0.69 1.00 0.55
Japan 1.03 1.00 0.88
UK 0.58 1.00 0.47
US 0.55 1.00 0.26
Relative Standard Deviation (U.S.) of Industrial Production 
BW PBW ERM
Canada 0.79 0.75 2.53
France 1.07 0.82 2.31
Germany 1.75 0.79 3.22
Italy 1.42 1.13 2.41
Japan 2.00 1.07 3.64
UK 1.07 1.02 1.87
US 1.00 1.00 1.00
Source: Author's calculations using International Monetary Fund monthly industrial 
production data from International Financial Statistics on CD-ROM.
Notes: All reported data are filtered using Baxter/King band pass filter using a moving 
average of 36 months, designed to capture frequencies of 18 months to 96 months (8 
years). Correlation coefficients are calculated using data from the specified exchange rate 
period. For example, correlation coefficients in the BW column are calculated from data 
covering the years from the beginning of the sample 1958M1 to 1971M6.
International Business Cycle Volatility Under Fixed and Flexible 
Exchange Rate Regimes
Table 2BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 6 9 7 9 1 103101100203021
6 7 9 8 7 8 5 1 2 16123212643051
12 5 1 6 6 5 1 3 3 163943279 1 6 906 2 4
24 21 40 27 22 1 3 31 24 2 1 1 13 24 29 9 1 5 47
36 17 27 19 24 1 5 36 33 1 1 2 14 21 34 14 1 4 47
60 14 17 19 34 4 12 35 39 0 1 2 14 16 35 19 1 3 36
BCF 2 4 3 2 1 9 2 8 9 2 2 2 5 2 4 2268 2 0 2 3 1 2 16 3 7
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 1 5 1 1 8 5 7 9 7 1 413013046204
6 8 2 2 9 8 6 6 1 6 9 4381231 1 1 7104
12 5 2 3 6 8 3 3 9 6 8 8 1 1 71522 2 2 510 1 2
24 4 1 5 3 5 7 1 7 4 6 2 6 2 8 5135 1 0 3 7 520 3 6
36 5 1 0 3 5 3 9 3 1 3 0 3 7 3038 1 0 4 1 1 3 20 4 1
60 66 1 1 5 4 9 2 8 2 9 4 2 20398 4 1 2 1 20 2 9
BCF 1 0 1 1 8 5 1 2 5 5 0 2 6 2 6 31949 2 6 1 4 23 2 2
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 5 9 7 9 4 222001000103100
6 8 8 9 0 8 3 855137001223101
12 8 1 6 9 6 0 1 0 443 1 1 60416 1 0 2 5 035
24 5 4 3 9 4 0 1 0 287 2 4 2161 1 9 2 7 4 3 826
36 4 8 2 4 3 0 1 2 266 3 3 1181 1 7 3 1 5 8 1 5 24
60 4 7 1 7 1 6 1 5 266 4 3 1190 1 6 2 7 7 2 1 4 25
BCF 4 1 3 4 4 2 86 2 1 7 2 4 3251 2 3 2 5 2 7 1 9 77
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 351 8 9 9 2 9 0 112002403312
6 9 1 5 2 8 1 8 0 8 6 126112413312
12 1 5 2 6 2 7 2 5 6 8 4 155151422865
24 2 5 2 4 4 5 4 3 6 7 7 1 1 2 51615 1 4 2 1 4 7 1 1
36 3 1 1 8 1 0 4 6 2 6 7 4 3 2 1 41717 2 2 2 1 2 59
60 3 1 1 4 1 4 3 8 1 8 6 1 4 3 3 3181 1 0 2 3 1 5 1 6 46
BCF 1 6 2 2 6 3 0 3 7 7 7 3 1 1 3241 1 7 1 4 5 3 1 1 2 7
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 7 9 9 9 6 100101110202000
6 9 3 9 5 8 8 110027211214101
12 7 0 7 9 6 5 6124 1 1 8211 1 5 6 2 2 423
24 4 5 4 4 4 6 453 1 5 2 1 5520 2 9 1 7 4 0 2 1 1 5
36 4 7 2 6 3 7 5 1 1 2 1 6 2 5 4520 2 4 2 2 5 3 2 1 3 4
60 4 1 1 8 3 0 1 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 3620 2 4 2 3 6 3 4 1 2 2
BCF 2 7 3 6 3 4 6 1 6 2 0 1 8 1 8 4810 3 3 1 6 3 4 9 1 3 8
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 071 9 1 8 8 9 0 721115003120
6 3 1 7 2 8 3 7 5 8 9 831225213230
12 3 2 9 3 7 3 6 0 8 9 651424522921
24 2 2 4 5 5 5 4 0 8 7 4 1 0 17246 1 3 3 2 5 1 1 1
36 7 1 5 5 4 1 3 2 8 4 4 1 6 1824 1 0 2 1 3 3 1 1 4 2
60 2 0 1 1 5 2 9 2 6 8 3 1 0 2 6 1724 1 1 2 3 4 2 3 1 2 3
BCF 1 6 1 7 2 3 7 4 9 8 8 1 2 904134 1 2 5 2 7 1 2 1
Germany
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
U.S. Industrial  German Industrial  U.S. Inflation U.S.--German  U.S. Interest Rate U.S.--German 
U.S.--Germany Model
U.S.
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
U.S. Industrial  German Industrial  U.S. Inflation U.S.--German  U.S. Interest Rate U.S.--German 
France
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
U.S. Industrial  French Industrial  U.S. Inflation U.S.--French  U.S. Interest Rate U.S.--French 
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead






















Percentage of forecast error due to:










ProductionBW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 2 9 7 9 0 421001000307010
6 8 6 9 1 8 4 943015101347110
12 8 3 7 0 8 1 1 1 441391002 2 1 5211
24 6 0 3 3 6 5 9348 1 5 1 4 0113 4 6 1 4 2 0 02
36 5 1 2 1 5 0 7539 2 0 1 6 1215 5 1 2 8 2 8 01
60 5 1 1 6 3 7 1 0 1 3 57 1 8 1 6 2316 4 9 4 0 2 4 11
BCF 3 4 4 3 4 1 75 1 4 1 2 1 9 7211 1 7 3 1 3 0 2 8 16
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 03 1 7 9 8 9 6 7 8 002110101001
6 2 1 0 2 3 8 7 8 8 6 4 213411412117
12 8 1 9 2 6 8 1 7 6 5 3 11330252411 1 3
24 2 2 1 8 3 0 6 8 6 2 4 7 1233125 1 6 811 1 1
36 2 8 1 4 2 9 5 4 4 9 4 6 3642125 2 9 861 1 2
60 3 3 1 1 2 9 4 0 4 2 3 8 5972225 3 5 1 5 1 4 1 1 0
BCF 1 6 2 4 1 6 5 1 4 6 4 6 6 1 2 2311 1 2 1 6 1 4 1 3 1 2 1
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 7 9 7 9 0 000111003204010
6 9 2 8 8 8 2 031019204333250
12 7 9 6 2 7 2 1 1 2 612 1 0 1134 1 3 7 1 3 1 0 2
24 4 8 2 8 4 2 3 1 0 2 6 2 0 1 3 5112 1 5 3 0 1 0 1 3 1 7 1 5
36 4 0 1 9 2 6 3 1 0 3 8 2 6 2 0 2112 1 3 3 3 1 7 1 6 1 7 1 5
60 3 3 1 3 1 5 2 1 3 4 5 2 6 2 4 1112 1 1 2 7 2 7 2 7 2 1 1 0
BCF 4 0 4 0 4 7 47 1 3 2 1 1 5 1322 1 7 2 3 2 8 1 6 1 2 8
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 1 2 0 2 8 5 7 8 9 5 010511002810
6 2 2 5 7 6 9 6 4 8 9 011511301 2 0 81
12 1 1 9 1 0 3 7 4 7 8 0 052712533 5 1 2 6 2
24 3 1 1 1 1 1 6 2 6 7 6 1 1 5 2702286 7 1 4 0 3
36 58 1 0 1 1 2 3 6 7 3 1 9 36021 1 1 1 1 7 3 3 9 7
60 85 1 0 7 2 3 6 0 8 2 1 45031 1 0 1 2 7 1 4 0 1 1
BCF 6 1 4 8 1 6 2 1 5 4 8 1 6 55134 1 1 2 0 6 2 3 8 1 0
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 8 9 9 8 5 000001003114006
6 9 0 9 1 7 0 31731210527300 1 2
12 7 0 6 5 5 9 557253405 1 8 2 5 1 6 10 1 0
24 2 7 3 5 4 6 3741 1 7 4 1 5 17 4 7 3 9 3 2 717
36 2 9 2 2 3 1 3621 2 8 4 1 5 34 4 5 4 1 5 6 714
60 2 7 1 3 2 3 4521 3 7 3 1 5 41 4 6 4 0 6 9 811
BCF 3 0 3 4 2 2 4590 2 5 1 1 5 4 1 1 4 2 3 0 4 3 91 1 3
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 032 7 7 9 6 8 3 201 1 5 01305219
6 234 6 7 9 0 8 2 221 2 4 21314228
12 344 5 7 7 0 8 0 151 3 3 353 1 6 4327
24 233 4 8 3 2 6 7 1 2 3 1 3 9 587 3 6 832 1 4
36 3 2 2 47 19 47 1 33 1 40 6 5 7 38 34 2 2 12
60 3 1 3 44 13 24 1 40 1 40 6 5 9 37 61 3 2 6
BCF 4 2 64 7 3 6 2 902 903 531 2 1 0 2 7 3 94 31 3
UK
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
U.S. Industrial  UK Industrial  U.S. Inflation U.S.--UK Inflation  U.S. Interest Rate U.S.--UK Interest 
U.S.--UK Model
U.S.
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
U.S. Industrial  UK Industrial  U.S. Inflation U.S.--UK Inflation  U.S. Interest Rate U.S.--UK Interest 
Japan
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
U.S. Industrial  Japaneseese  U.S. Inflation U.S.--Japanese  U.S. Interest Rate U.S.--Japanese 
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
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U.S.--Italian Interest 
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Differential U.S. Interest Rate
U.S.--Italian Interest 
Rate Differential
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
AheadBW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 6 9 0 9 6 231030021010211
6 9 2 7 4 9 3 3 1 7 1032141210112
12 8 9 5 5 9 4 6 2 7 1052381240112
24 7 8 3 5 9 3 1 3 2 3 10 1 1 24825 1 4 0192
36 6 6 3 0 9 1 1 9 1 7 30 1 2 23629 1 8 03 1 7 2
60 5 7 2 7 8 3 2 5 1 2 30 1 2 2343 1 0 1 7 25 2 8 6
BCF 7 0 3 9 8 0 1 2 1 6 2072354 1 0 1 1 33 2 1 1 0
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 011 9 3 9 5 9 2 101321302113
6 021 7 6 8 3 9 1 112671 1 4 13252
12 124 6 0 6 1 7 8 1743 1 3 2 2 5 42 1 1 1 4 1 0
24 218 5 3 3 6 3 5 0 1 3 2199 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 1 3 5
36 10 4 4 52 23 16 0 14 1 1 6 14 18 15 17 19 38 48
60 23 10 7 47 13 6 0 13 1 1 3 15 15 16 17 15 44 54
BCF 18 14 20 36 20 9 0 10 1 2 5 13 22 13 14 22 38 43
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 2 9 4 9 0 214131410114101
6 8 2 9 2 8 1 238121 1 1 11116204
12 6 4 8 7 7 1 45 1 4 122 1 8 11738515
24 3 6 6 2 6 5 1 1 6 1 7 091 2 0 31 2 5 1 9 8727
36 2 4 4 1 5 9 1 571 701 322 17 23 3 2 9 1 26 2 8
60 18 30 48 19 13 15 0 13 2 22 13 3 36 27 22 5 4 9
BCF 24 46 58 15 6 11 1 9 2 17 7 1 36 26 22 7 7 5
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 4 2 3 1 7 9 1 7 3 7 9 001021112311
6 1 3 4 4 2 3 7 4 4 9 7 1 312461213411
12 1 7 5 0 2 5 6 5 4 1 6 4 311671314614
24 21 42 17 45 35 52 2 5 1 12 9 3 14 10 15 7 1 12
36 17 31 14 35 28 31 1 9 3 16 11 5 24 20 34 6 1 13
60 1 4 2 3 1 2 3 2 2 8 1 811 041 8 1 573 0 2 0 4 65 31 3
BCF 18 40 22 32 20 17 1 7 4 14 6 5 29 22 42 6 5 10
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 2 9 1 9 3 151120413210002
6 8 3 8 2 8 9 4 1 3 1113824210213
12 6 6 6 7 8 8 4 2 7 2114 1 2 13 1 0 10633
24 4 5 4 4 8 5 3 2 5 4174 1 4 13 2 8 61 1 1 1 8 3
36 3 1 3 5 8 351 65 01 251 21 33 18 12 0 2 84
60 2 5 3 0 8 1 1 1 1 05 11 651 00 32 78 12 6 3 65
BCF 2 8 5 4 8 1 1 1 1 4 3097 1 3 12 3 5 60 1 2 1 6 7
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 011 9 5 9 8 9 6 300010000102
6 131 9 1 9 3 9 4 310100200234
12 432 6 7 8 3 7 3 421111313 2 2 1 1 2 0
24 363 3 7 5 2 5 4 291000266 5 6 2 6 3 6
36 6 1 3 3 3 5 3 1 4 3 2 1 4 1100485 5 3 3 4 4 8
60 1 6 1 7 2 2 5 1 8 3 6 2 1 7 2200683 4 7 4 0 5 8
BCF 8 2 1 1 7 2 0 3 7 3 8 1 1 1 5500 1 8 77 4 9 2 4 3 3
U.S.
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
German Industrial  U.S. Industrial  German Inflation German--U.S.  German Interest  German--U.S. 
Germany--U.S. Model
Germany
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
German Industrial  U.S. Industrial  German Inflation German--U.S.  German Interest  German--U.S. 
France
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
German Industrial  French Industrial  German Inflation German--French  German Interest  German--French 
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead

































Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
AheadBW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 4 9 2 9 7 031120201112220
6 8 7 8 2 8 8 2 1 3 2111516312332
12 8 5 7 4 8 3 3 1 5 212261 1 0 231362
24 7 6 5 1 7 4 9 1 4 22825293 1 5 14 1 0 1 2
36 6 7 3 9 6 4 1 8 1 4 53 1 1 25593 2 0 35 1 1 1 8
60 56 32 47 30 17 12 3 11 2 4 9 11 3 21 11 5 10 16
BCF 6 8 6 2 5 6 1 1 8726275 1 4 5 1 3 1 0 76 1 1
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 166 9 6 9 0 8 9 201032012000
6 1 1 8 8 8 9 7 5 8 2 411261417011
12 2 3 3 1 1 8 5 6 1 6 3 31224441 1 8 412
24 2 3 3 8 8 2 5 1 4 5 22224536 3 5 934
36 5 2 6 9 7 8 4 6 3 8 25226 1 0 3 1 3 3 5 1 0 56
60 7 2 1 9 7 7 4 4 3 4 1622 1 0 1 4 3 1 5 3 6 1 0 56
BCF 5 4 7 2 0 7 4 3 1 2 7 35234 1 1 3 1 1 3 0 1 2 2 1 0
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 6 9 2 9 5 242110020010002
6 9 1 8 7 8 4 371114131413017
12 8 9 7 2 6 7 5 1 2 611313533519 1 4
24 8 1 5 1 3 9 1 3 9 3 0 13213 1 3 3 2 0 31 1 3 1 4
36 6 6 5 2 4 0 1 7 7 3 0 14222 1 3 5 2 6 399 1 2
60 4 6 5 5 3 6 1 5 1 0 3 1 13172 1 5 6 2 1 3 2 5 9 1 4
BCF 6 4 6 0 3 7 87 3 3 13142 1 4 5 1 7 3 1 9 1 0 1 2
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 122 9 7 9 3 9 3 102012111120
6 144 9 3 8 5 8 8 212013311191
12 124 8 3 7 0 7 6 21111 1 1 111 1 2 2 6 6
24 3 1 6 9 4 4 4 4 6 0 11171 1 8 671 3 9 3 1 1 2
36 33 0 1 5 3 0 3 4 5 51 1 11 211 781 124 6 2 4 1 1
60 2 3 91 42 73 15 5 1 1 1 1 3 0 1 7 7 9 2 5 02 01 1
BCF 3 3 11 33 12 85 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 01 11 3 2 4 12 41 5
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 8 0 8 9 9 6 340050 1 2 00411113
6 5 7 8 7 8 6 2 4 31151915301746
12 3 7 8 2 7 9 3 4 2216241 1 0 1 0 30 1 3 67
24 1 8 5 7 7 5 3 71 4 31 621 211 0 1 6 2 001 34 9
36 1 1 3 7 7 4 3 15 5 42 122 511 0 1 7 3 201 14 9
60 92 4 7 2 2 6 1 15 42 323 821 0 1 5 3 71 9 41 0
BCF 1 9 5 0 7 5 2 6 833 1 0 2 2 9 3 1 1 1 3 2 0 0989
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 454 7 4 8 6 8 3 035 1 2 41633404
6 8 1 0 4 5 4 7 7 8 0 234 2 3 51845616
12 62 044 1 5 7 7 82 7 42 44 61 5 1 041 11 5
24 31 583 2 3 3 6 041 973 521 1 1 6 2 851 031 0
36 21 072 7 2 7 4 942 394 321 1 1 5 3 55 8 42 0
60 3 72 3 2 3 2 5 3 842 375 02 71 4 3 93 7 42 1
BCF 72 3 3 5 2 8 3 0 2 841 643 25 71 7 2 421 232 3
UK
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
German Industrial  UK Industrial  German Inflation German--UK  German Interest  German--UK Interest 
Germany--UK Model
Germany
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
German Industrial  UK Industrial  German Inflation German--UK  German Interest  German--UK Interest 
Japan
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
German Industrial  Japaneseese  German Inflation German--Japanese  German Interest  German--Japanese 
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead

































Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
AheadBW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 8 8 8 8 9 4 182321012700002
6 7 2 7 8 9 1 2 1 1 4361011 1 9 31511
12 3 9 5 2 8 4 1673 2 4 1001 4 9 1 7 2804
24 1 7 2 1 8 0 3283 4 2 2121 7 2 3 1 3417
36 1 1 1 6 7 1 6273 4 7 2121 7 6 3 0 532 1 3
60 7 1 4 6 4 9272 4 9 3323 7 6 3 0 1 0 33 1 4
BCF 1 7 2 0 6 4 7542 4 0 3242 6 4 2 9 782 1 9
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 050 9 7 9 3 8 9 012002000206
6 091 9 1 8 3 8 7 243002231415
12 1 1 6 6 8 0 5 3 7 8 1 1 5 2032 1 2 63579
24 49 2 5 4 8 2 5 4 4 1 3 3 2733 1 7 1 4 1 6 2 3 1 7 1 0
36 46 3 8 4 1 2 2 2 5 1 3 6 1924 2 1 1 5 1 6 2 4 2 0 1 6
60 35 4 7 3 5 2 0 1 3 1 3 9 0923 3 3 1 7 1 0 2 0 1 7 2 6
BCF 59 1 5 3 9 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 1724 1 8 1 0 1 2 2 9 1 3 2 6
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 9 3 9 2 9 5 101341122010111
6 8 8 8 1 9 1 312491114051341
12 7 7 5 3 7 9 5324 2 4 111 1 1 1 2 1 6 6231
24 39 24 62 4 17 6 3 31 1 4 1 19 48 21 13 2 7 1
36 26 16 57 3 27 11 2 28 0 7 1 18 59 16 12 2 13 1
60 23 13 56 2 36 11 2 26 0 8 0 19 63 13 12 2 11 1
BCF 28 20 50 3 22 10 2 22 0 9 1 22 55 17 17 3 18 1
BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM BW PBW ERM
3 783 9 0 8 8 9 5 100231000010
6 1 1 1 2 3 8 0 8 1 8 8 101244012522
12 1 6 1 5 6 7 2 6 9 7 2 231348169624
24 2 6 1 0 2 6 6 2 4 7 4 1 28034 1 6 2 1 1 1 4 6 2 1 3
36 2 3 7 2 7 5 2 4 5 4 0 26033 1 6 1 3 8 1 3 7 3 2 3
60 1 8 6 2 8 3 7 4 9 3 7 28052 1 8 3 4 7 1 5 5 2 7 2
BCF 1 1 1 1 2 9 5 5 4 9 3 7 26023 1 6 2 2 8 1 5 8 2 4 3
Germany
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead
Japaneseese  German  Industrial  Japaneseese Japanese--German Japaneseese Japanese--German 
Percentage of forecast error due to:
Months 
Ahead























































BW 0.83 1.05 1.89 7.87 0.25 0.27
PBW 0.65 1.29 2.85 13.59 0.65 0.50
ERM 0.38 0.61 1.64 12.33 0.12 0.39
Ratio
 BW/PBW 1.27 0.82 0.66 0.58 0.39 0.54














BW 0.64 3.61 1.67 10.70 0.25 0.32
PBW 0.66 1.36 2.83 33.35 0.68 0.48
ERM 0.39 0.83 1.71 28.78 0.12 0.44
Ratio
 BW/PBW 0.97 2.67 0.59 0.32 0.36 0.67














BW 0.65 1.55 1.69 6.81 0.23 0.61
PBW 0.66 1.53 2.85 35.17 0.66 1.02
ERM 0.41 1.18 1.69 30.69 0.12 0.16
Ratio
 BW/PBW 0.98 1.01 0.59 0.19 0.35 0.59














BW 0.63 1.83 1.66 4.22 0.24 0.14
PBW 0.66 2.35 2.88 29.66 0.66 0.27
ERM 0.41 1.29 1.71 31.40 0.11 0.31
Ratio
 BW/PBW 0.95 0.78 0.57 0.14 0.36 0.53















BW 0.87 1.05 1.71 8.04 0.25 0.93
PBW 0.63 1.00 2.71 34.92 0.67 0.35
ERM 0.39 1.02 1.61 35.46 0.12 0.14
Ratio
 BW/PBW 1.39 1.05 0.63 0.23 0.38 2.64












BW 0.58 0.70 1.38 14.98 0.20 0.19
PBW 0.64 1.47 2.89 32.35 0.66 0.53
ERM 0.35 0.58 1.62 29.20 0.12 0.22
Ratio
 BW/PBW 0.90 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.30 0.36





























BW 1.57 0.92 2.91 9.52 0.61 0.31
PBW 1.50 1.27 2.80 35.18 0.96 0.74
ERM 1.25 0.67 3.44 32.47 0.16 0.41
Ratio
 BW/PBW 1.05 0.72 1.04 0.27 0.64 0.41















BW 1.56 3.43 3.11 13.02 0.62 0.34
PBW 1.56 1.21 2.82 16.72 0.98 0.51
ERM 1.12 0.84 3.52 6.18 0.17 0.43
Ratio
 BW/PBW 1.01 2.83 1.10 0.78 0.63 0.66















BW 1.54 0.64 2.88 6.32 0.61 0.23
PBW 1.55 0.67 2.76 35.30 0.98 0.68
ERM 1.22 0.41 3.51 28.08 0.16 0.12
Ratio
 BW/PBW 0.99 0.94 1.04 0.18 0.63 0.35















BW 1.58 1.77 2.85 6.81 0.63 0.15
PBW 1.53 2.20 2.70 23.39 0.94 0.26
ERM 1.20 1.35 3.39 21.32 0.17 0.31
Ratio
 BW/PBW 1.04 0.80 1.06 0.29 0.68 0.55
















BW 1.52 0.92 2.93 9.56 0.64 0.84
PBW 1.54 1.06 2.67 32.67 1.01 0.34
ERM 1.20 1.05 3.46 32.37 0.15 0.13
Ratio
 BW/PBW 0.99 0.87 1.10 0.29 0.63 2.47















BW 0.98 0.70 2.41 16.06 0.64 0.20
PBW 1.52 1.47 2.69 31.57 1.00 0.55
ERM 1.21 0.58 3.53 22.92 0.14 0.21
Ratio
 BW/PBW 0.64 0.48 0.90 0.51 0.64 0.37






























BW 1.07 0.88 8.08 2.92 0.92 0.27
PBW 0.99 0.62 7.89 35.22 0.35 0.66
ERM 1.03 0.39 3.93 33.62 0.14 0.12
Ratio
 BW/PBW 1.08 1.42 1.02 0.08 2.62 0.41

















BW 0.94 1.48 7.07 7.57 0.81 0.62
PBW 1.01 1.53 7.86 33.04 0.35 1.04
ERM 1.06 1.21 3.73 31.37 0.13 0.15
Ratio
 BW/PBW 0.93 0.96 0.90 0.23 2.30 0.60
 ERM/PBW 1.05 0.79 0.47 0.95 0.36 0.14
Table 8




Structural DisturbanceCorrelation of Industrial production with US
Post-Bretton 
Woods
(PBW,PBW) (BW,BW) (BW,PBW) (PBW,BW) (ERM,ERM) (ERM,PBW) (PBW,ERM)
Canada 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.82
France 0.86 0.02 -0.38 0.81 0.31 0.22 0.86
Germany 0.87 -0.20 0.03 0.84 0.02 -0.11 0.82
Italy 0.68 0.29 0.13 0.67 0.42 0.42 0.65
Japan 0.81 0.29 -0.04 0.84 -0.13 -0.13 0.77
UK 0.70 0.49 0.56 0.59 0.82 0.87 0.68
US 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Correlation of Industrial production with Germany
Post-Bretton 
Woods
(PBW,PBW) (BW,BW) (BW,PBW) (PBW,BW) (ERM,ERM) (ERM,PBW) (PBW,ERM)
Canada 0.85 0.08 0.06 0.79 0.15 0.34 0.83
France 0.89 0.77 0.93 0.74 0.83 0.88 0.91
Germany 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Italy 0.81 0.04 -0.16 0.83 0.66 0.59 0.81
Japan 0.83 0.32 0.43 0.86 0.59 0.74 0.80
UK 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.83 0.14 0.20 0.86
US 0.87 -0.37 -0.34 0.84 0.06 -0.09 0.85
Correlation of Industrial production with Japan
Post-Bretton 
Woods
(PBW,PBW) (BW,BW) (BW,PBW) (PBW,BW) (ERM,ERM) (ERM,PBW) (PBW,ERM)
Canada 0.68 0.26 -0.11 0.74 -0.20 -0.06 0.74
France 0.79 0.68 0.80 0.67 0.51 0.54 0.78
Germany 0.81 0.32 0.31 0.85 0.59 0.77 0.79
Italy 0.74 0.52 0.60 0.85 0.04 -0.03 0.75
Japan 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
UK 0.61 0.36 0.40 0.53 0.00 -0.15 0.23
US 0.79 0.28 0.32 0.82 -0.07 0.00 0.79
Table 9
Simulated International Business Cycle Comovement 
Bretton Woods Exchange Rate Mechanism
Exchange Rate Mechanism Bretton Woods
Bretton Woods Exchange Rate MechanismSource: Author's calculations using International Monetary Fund monthly industrial production data from International Financial Statistics on CD-ROM.
Cyclical Movements of U.S. and G7 Industrial Production
Figure 1





































































































































































































































UK U.S.Source: Author's calculations using International Monetary Fund monthly industrial production data from International Financial Statistics on CD-ROM.
Cyclical Movements of German and G7 Industrial Production
Figure 2





































































































































































































































UK GermanyNotes: Solid line is the point estimate of the impulse response from the bilateral VAR for the U.S. and Germany estimated over the PBW era. The dashed lines 
are 90 percent confidence intervals computed using standard bootstrap Monte Carlo procedures. 
Figure 3
Impulse response functions: Shock to U.S. Industrial Production














































































































































































Impulse response functions: Shock to German Industrial Production














































































































































































Impulse response functions: Shock to U.S. Inflation
















































































































































































Impulse response functions: Shock to German-U.S. Inflation Differential




















































































































































































Impulse response functions: Shock to U.S. Interest Rates
















































































































































































Impulse response functions: Shock to German-U.S. Interest Rate Differential
















































































































































































Impulse response functions: U.S. vs. Canadian Industrial Production
Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production
Bretton Woods Post-Bretton Woods Exchange Rate Mechanism
Shock to U.S.-Canadian Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-Canadian Inflation Differential
Shock to Canadian Industrial Production Shock to Canadian Industrial Production Shock to Canadian Industrial Production
Shock to U.S.-Canadian Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-Canadian Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-Canadian Interest Rate Differential
Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation
Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dImpulse response functions: U.S. vs. French Industrial Production
Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production
Bretton Woods Post-Bretton Woods Exchange Rate Mechanism
Shock to U.S.-French Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-French Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-French Inflation Differential
Shock to French Industrial Production Shock to French Industrial Production Shock to French Industrial Production
Figure 10
Shock to U.S.-French Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-French Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-French Interest Rate Differential
Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shock to U.S.-German Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-German Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-German Interest Rate Differential
Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation
Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate
Shock to U.S.-German Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-German Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-German Inflation Differential
Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production
Impulse response functions: U.S. vs. German Industrial Production
Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dShock to U.S.-Italian Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-Italian Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-Italian Interest Rate Differential
Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation
Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate
Shock to U.S.-Italian Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-Italian Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-Italian Inflation Differential
Shock to Italian Industrial Production Shock to Italian Industrial Production Shock to Italian Industrial Production
Figure 12
Impulse response functions: U.S. vs. Italian Industrial Production
Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dShock to U.S.-Japanese Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-Japanese Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-Japanese Interest Rate Differential
Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation
Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate
Shock to U.S.-Japanese Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-Japanese Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-Japanese Inflation Differential
Shock to Japanese Industrial Production Shock to Japanese Industrial Production Shock to Japanese Industrial Production
Figure 13
Impulse response functions: U.S. vs. Japanese Industrial Production
Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Shock to U.S.-U.K. Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-U.K. Interest Rate Differential Shock to U.S.-U.K. Interest Rate Differential
Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation Shock to U.S. Inflation
Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate Shock to U.S. Interest Rate
Shock to U.S.-U.K. Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-U.K. Inflation Differential Shock to U.S.-U.K. Inflation Differential
Shock to U.K. Industrial Production Shock to U.K. Industrial Production Shock to U.K. Industrial Production
Impulse response functions: U.S. vs. U.K. Industrial Production
Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dShock to German-French Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-French Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-French Interest Rate Differential
Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation
Shock to German Interest Rate Shock to German Interest Rate Shock to German Interest Rate
Shock to German-French Inflation Differential Shock to German-French Inflation Differential Shock to German-French Inflation Differential
Shock to French Industrial Production Shock to French Industrial Production Shock to French Industrial Production
Figure 15
Impulse response functions: German vs. French Industrial Production
Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dImpulse response functions: German vs. Italian Industrial Production
Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production
Bretton Woods Post-Bretton Woods Exchange Rate Mechanism
Shock to German-Italian Inflation Differential Shock to German-Italian Inflation Differential Shock to German-Italian Inflation Differential
Shock to Italian Industrial Production Shock to Italian Industrial Production Shock to Italian Industrial Production
Figure 16
Shock to German-Italian Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-Italian Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-Italian Interest Rate Differential
Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dShock to German-Japanese Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-Japanese Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-Japanese Interest Rate Differential
Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation
Shock to German Interest Rate Shock to German Interest Rate Shock to German Interest Rate
Shock to German-Japanese Inflation Differential Shock to German-Japanese Inflation Differential Shock to German-Japanese Inflation Differential
Shock to Japanese Industrial Production Shock to Japanese Industrial Production Shock to Japanese Industrial Production
Figure 17
Impulse response functions: German vs. Japanese Industrial Production
Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dImpulse response functions: German vs. U.K. Industrial Production
Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production
Bretton Woods Post-Bretton Woods Exchange Rate Mechanism
Shock to German-U.K. Inflation Differential Shock to German-U.K. Inflation Differential Shock to German-U.K. Inflation Differential
Shock to U.K. Industrial Production Shock to U.K. Industrial Production Shock to U.K. Industrial Production
Figure 18
Shock to German-U.K. Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-U.K. Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-U.K. Interest Rate Differential
Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dImpulse response functions: German vs. U.S. Industrial Production
Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production
Bretton Woods Post-Bretton Woods Exchange Rate Mechanism
Shock to German-U.S. Inflation Differential Shock to German-U.S. Inflation Differential Shock to German-U.S. Inflation Differential
Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production
Figure 19
Shock to German-U.S. Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-U.S. Interest Rate Differential Shock to German-U.S. Interest Rate Differential
Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation Shock to German Inflation
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dImpulse response functions: Japanese vs. German Industrial Production
Shock to Japanese Industrial Production Shock to Japanese Industrial Production Shock to Japanese Industrial Production
Bretton Woods Post-Bretton Woods Exchange Rate Mechanism
Shock to Japanese-German Inflation Differential Shock to Japanese-German Inflation Differential Shock to Japanese-German Inflation Differential
Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production Shock to German Industrial Production
Figure 20
Shock to Japanese-German Interest Rate Differential Shock to Japanese-German Interest Rate Differential Shock to Japanese-German Interest Rate Differential
Shock to Japanese Inflation Shock to Japanese Inflation Shock to Japanese Inflation
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dShock to Japanese-U.S. Interest Rate Differential Shock to Japanese-U.S. Interest Rate Differential Shock to Japanese-U.S. Interest Rate Differential
Shock to Japanese Inflation Shock to Japanese Inflation Shock to Japanese Inflation
Shock to Japanese Interest Rate Shock to Japanese Interest Rate Shock to Japanese Interest Rate
Shock to Japanese-U.S. Inflation Differential Shock to Japanese-U.S. Inflation Differential Shock to Japanese-U.S. Inflation Differential
Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production Shock to U.S. Industrial Production
Figure 21
Impulse response functions: Japanese vs. U.S. Industrial Production
Shock to Japanese Industrial Production Shock to Japanese Industrial Production Shock to Japanese Industrial Production
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